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Abstract
The menu-dependent nature of regret-minimization creates subtleties when it is applied
to dynamic decision problems. It is not clear whether forgone opportunities should be
included in the menu. We explain commonly observed behavioral patterns as minimizing
regret when forgone opportunities are present. If forgone opportunities are included, we can
characterize when a form of dynamic consistency is guaranteed.
1 Introduction
Savage [1951] and Anscombe and Aumann [1963] showed that a decision maker maximizing
expected utility with respect to a probability measure over the possible states of the world is
characterized by a set of arguably desirable principles. However, as Allais [1953] and Ellsberg
[1961] point out using compelling examples, sometimes intuitive choices are incompatible with
maximizing expected utility. One reason for this incompatibility is that there is often ambiguity
in the problems we face; we often lack sufficient information to capture all uncertainty using a
single probability measure over the possible states.
To this end, there is a rich literature offering alternative means of making decisions (see,
e.g., [Al-Najjar and Weinstein 2009] for a survey). For example, we might choose to represent
uncertainty using a set of possible states of the world, but using no probabilistic information
at all to represent how likely each state is. With this type of representation, two well-studied
rules for decision-making are maximin utility and minimax regret. Maximin says that you
should choose the option that maximizes the worst-case payoff, while minimax regret says that
you should choose the option that minimizes the regret you’ll feel at the end, where, roughly
speaking, regret is the difference between the payoff you achieved, and the payoff that you
could have achieved had you known what the true state of the world was. Both maximin and
minimax regret can be extended naturally to deal with other representations of uncertainty. For
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example, with a set of probability measures over the possible states, minimax regret becomes
minimax expected regret (MER) [Hayashi 2011; Stoye 2011]. Other works that use a set of
probablity measures include, for example, [Campos and Moral 1995; Cousa, Moral, and Walley
1999; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993; Levi 1985; Walley 1991].
In this paper, we consider a generalization of minimax expected regret called minimax
weighted expected regret (MWER) that we introduced in an earlier paper [Halpern and Leung
2012]. For MWER, uncertainty is represented by a set of weighted probability measures. Intu-
itively, the weight represents how likely the probability measure is to be the true distribution
over the states, according to the decision maker (henceforth DM). The weights work much like
a “second-order” probability on the set of probability measures. Similar ideas can be dated
back to at least Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin [1982, 1983]; see also [Good 1980] for discussion and fur-
ther references. Walley [1997] suggested putting a possibility measure [Dubois and Prade 1998;
?] on probability measures; this was also essentially done by Cattaneo [2007], Chateauneuf
and Faro [2009], and de Cooman [2005]. All of these authors and others (e.g., Klibanoff et al.
[2005]; Maccheroni et al. [2006]; Nau [1992]) proposed approaches to decision making using
their representations of uncertainty.
Real-life problems are often dynamic, with many stages where actions can be taken; in-
formation can be learned over time. Before applying regret minimization to dynamic decision
problems, there is a subtle issue that we must consider. In static decision problems, the regret
for each act is computed with respect to a menu. That is, each act is judged against the other
acts in the menu. Typically, we think of the menu as consisting of the feasible acts, that is, the
ones that the DM can perform. The analogue in a dynamic setting would be the feasible plans,
where a plan is just a sequence of actions leading to a final outcome. In a dynamic decision
problem, as more actions are taken, some plans become forgone opportunities. These are plans
that were initially available to the DM, but are no longer available due to earlier actions of the
DM. Since regret intuitively captures comparison of a choice against its alternatives, it seems
reasonable for the menu to include all the feasible plans at the point of decision-making. But
should the menu include forgone opportunities?
Consequentialists would argue that it is irrational to care about forgone opportunities [Ham-
mond 1976; Machina 1989]; we should simply focus on the opportunities that are still available
to us, and thus not include forgone opportunities in the menu. And, indeed, when regret has
been considered in dynamic settings thus far (e.g., by Hayashi [2011]), the menu has not in-
cluded forgone opportunities. However, introspection tells us that we sometimes do take forgone
opportunities into account when we feel regret. For example, when considering a new job, one
might compare the available options to what might have been available if one had chosen a
different career path years ago. As we show, including forgone opportunities in the menu can
make a big difference in behavior. Consider procrastination: we tell ourselves that we will
start studying for an exam (or start exercising, or quit smoking) tomorrow; and then tomorrow
comes, and we again tell ourselves that we will do it, starting tomorrow. This behavior is hard
to explain with standard decision-theoretic approaches, especially when we assume that no new
information about the world is gained over time. However, we give an example where, if forgone
opportunities are not included in the menu, then we get procrastination; if they are, then we
do not get procrastination.
This example can be generalized. Procrastination is an example of preference reversal : the
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DM’s preference at time t for what he should do at time t+ 1 reverses when she actually gets
to time t + 1. We prove in Section 3 that if the menu includes forgone opportunities and the
DM acquires no new information over time (as is the case in the procrastination problem),
then a DM who uses regret to make her decisions will not suffer preference reversals. Thus, we
arguably get more rational behavior when we include forgone opportunities in the menu.
What happens if the DM does get information over time? It is well known that, in this
setting, expected utility maximizers are guaranteed to have no preference reversals. Epstein and
Le Breton [1993] have shown that, under minimal assumptions, to avoid preference reversals, the
DM must be an expected utility maximizer. On the other hand, Epstein and Schneider [2003]
show that a DM using MMEU never has preference reversals if her beliefs satisfy a condition they
call rectangularity. Hayashi [2011] shows that rectangularity also prevents preference reversals
for MER under certain assumptions. Unfortunately, the rectangularity condition is often not
satisfied in practice. Other conditions have been provided that guarantee dynamic consistency
for ambiguity-averse decision rules (see, e.g., [Al-Najjar and Weinstein 2009] for an overview).
We consider the question of preference reversal in the context of regret. Hayashi [2011] has
observed that, in dynamic decision problems, both changes in menu over time and updates to
the DM’s beliefs can result in preference reversals. In Section 4, we show that keeping forgone
opportunities in the menu is necessary in order to prevent preference reversals. But, as we show
by example, it is not sufficient if the DM acquires new information over time. We then provide a
condition on the beliefs that is necessary and sufficient to guarantee that a DM making decisions
using MWER whose beliefs satisfy the condition will not have preference reversals. However,
because this necessary and sufficient condition may not be easy to check, we also give simpler
sufficient condition, similar in spirit to Epstein and Schneider’s [2003] rectangularity condition.
Since MER can be understood as a special case of MWER where all weights are either 1 or 0,
our condition for dynamic consistency is also applicable to MER.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discuss preliminaries. Section 3
introduces forgone opportunities. Section 4 gives conditions under which consistent planning is
not required. We conclude in Section 5. We defer most proofs to the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Static decision setting and regret
Given a set S of states and a set X of outcomes, an act f (over S and X) is a function mapping
S to X. We use F to denote the set of all acts. For simplicity in this paper, we take S to be
finite. Associated with each outcome x ∈ X is a utility: u(x) is the utility of outcome x. We
call a tuple (S,X, u) a (non-probabilistic) decision problem. To define regret, we need to assume
that we are also given a set M ⊆ F of acts, called the menu. The reason for the menu is that,
as is well known, regret can depend on the menu. We assume that every menu M has utilities
bounded from above. That is, we assume that for all menus M , supg∈M u(g(s)) is finite. This
ensures that the regret of each act is well defined. For a menu M and act f ∈M , the regret of
f with respect to M and decision problem (S,X, u) in state s is
regM (f, s) =
(
sup
g∈M
u(g(s))
)
− u(f(s)).
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That is, the regret of f in state s (relative to menu M) is the difference between u(f(s)) and
the highest utility possible in state s among all the acts in M . The regret of f with respect
to M and decision problem (S,X, u), denoted reg
(S,X,u)
M (f), is the worst-case regret over all
states:
reg
(S,X,u)
M (f) = maxs∈S
regM (f, s).
We typically omit superscript (S,X, u) in reg
(S,X,u)
M (f)if it is clear from context. The mini-
max regret decision rule chooses an act that minimizes maxs∈S regM (f, s). In other words, the
minimax regret choice function is
CregM (M
′) = argmin
f∈M ′
max
s∈S
regM (f, s).
The choice function returns the set of all acts in M ′ that minimize regret with respect to M .
Note that we allow the menu M ′, the set of acts over which we are minimizing regret, to be
different from the menu M of acts with respect to which regret is computed. For example, if
the DM considers forgone opportunities, they would be included in M , although not in M ′.
If there is a probability measure Pr over the σ-algebra Σ on the set S of states, then we
can consider the probabilistic decision problem (S,Σ, X, u,Pr). The expected regret of f with
respect to M is
regPrM (f) =
∑
s∈S
Pr(s)regM (f, s).
If there is a set P of probability measures over the σ-algebra Σ on the set S of states, states,
then we consider the P-decision problem D = (S,Σ, X, u,P). The maximum expected regret
of f ∈M with respect to M and D is
regPM (f) = sup
Pr∈P
(∑
s∈S
Pr(s)regM (f, s)
)
.
The minimax expected regret (MER) decision rule minimizes regPM (f).
In an earlier paper, we introduced another representation of uncertainty, weighted set of
probability measures [Halpern and Leung 2012]. A weighted set of probability measures gen-
eralizes a set of probability measures by associating each measure in the set with a weight,
intuitively corresponding to the reliability or significance of the measure in capturing the true
uncertainty of the world. Minimizing weighted expected regret with respect to a weighted set
of probability measures gives a variant of minimax regret, called Minimax Weighted Expected
Regret (MWER). A set P+ of weighted probability measures on (S,Σ) consists of pairs (Pr, αPr),
where αPr ∈ [0, 1] and Pr is a probability measure on (S,Σ). Let P = {Pr : ∃α(Pr, α) ∈ P+}.
We assume that, for each Pr ∈ P, there is exactly one α such that (Pr, α) ∈ P+. We denote
this number by αPr, and view it as the weight of Pr. We further assume for convenience that
weights have been normalized so that there is at least one measure Pr ∈ P such that αPr = 1.
If beliefs are modeled by a set P+ of weighted probabilities, then we consider the P+-decision
problem D+ = (S,X, u,P+). The maximum weighted expected regret of f ∈ M with respect
to M and D+ = (S,X, u,P+) is
regP
+
M (f) = sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
(
α
∑
s∈S
Pr(s)regM (f, s)
)
.
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If P+ is empty, then regP+M is identically zero. Of course, we can define the choice functions
Creg,PrM , C
reg,P
M , and C
reg,P+
M using reg
Pr
M , reg
P
M , and reg
P+
M , by analogy with C
reg
M .
2.2 Dynamic decision problems
A dynamic decision problem is a single-player extensive-form game where there is some set S
of states, nature chooses s ∈ S at the first step, and does not make any more moves. The DM
then performs a finite sequence of actions until some outcome is reached. Utility is assigned to
these outcomes. A history is a sequence recording the actions taken by nature and the DM. At
every history h, the DM considers possible some other histories. The DM’s information set at
h, denoted I(h), is the set of histories that the DM considers possible at h. Let s(h) denote the
initial state of h (i.e., nature’s first move); let R(h) denote all the moves the DM made in h after
nature’s first move; finally, let E(h) denote the set of states that the DM considers possible at
h; that is, E(h) = {s(h′) : h′ ∈ I(h)}. We assume that the DM has perfect recall : this means
that R(h′) = R(h) for all h′ ∈ I(h), and that if h′ is a prefix of h, then E(h′) ⊇ E(h).
A plan is a (pure) strategy: a mapping from histories to histories that result from taking
the action specified by the plan. We require that a plan specify the same action for all histories
in an information set; that is, if f is a plan, then for all histories h and h′ ∈ I(h), we must
have the last action in f(h) and f(h′) must be the same (so that R(f(h)) = R(f(h′))). Given
an initial state s, a plan determines a complete path to an outcome. Hence, we can also view
plans as acts: functions mapping states to outcomes. We take the acts in a dynamic decision
problem to be the set of possible plans, and evaluate them using the decision rules discussed
above.
A major difference between our model and that used by Epstein and Schneider [2003] and
Hayashi [2009] is that the latter assume a filtration information structure. With a filtration in-
formation structure, the DM’s knowledge is represented by a fixed, finite sequence of partitions.
More specifically, at time t, the DM uses a partition F (t) of the state space, and if the true
state is s, then all that the DM knows is that the true state is in the cell of F (t) containing s.
Since the sequence of partitions is fixed, the DM’s knowledge is independent of the choices that
she makes, and her options and preferences cannot depend on past choices. This assumption
significantly restricts the types of problems that can be naturally modeled. For example, if
the DM prefers to have one apple over two oranges at time t, then this must be her time t
preference, regardless of whether she has already consumed five apples at time t−1. Moreover,
consuming an apple at time t cannot preclude consuming an apple at time t + 1. Since we
effectively represent a decision problem as a single-player extensive-form game, we can capture
all of these situations in a straightforward way. The models of Epstein, Schneider, and Hayashi
can be viewed as a special case of our model.
In a dynamic decision problem, as we shall see, two different menus are relevant for making
a decision using regret-minimization: the menu with respect to which regrets are computed,
and the menu of feasible choices. We formalize this dependence by considering choice functions
of the form CM,E , where E,M 6= ∅. CM,E is a function mapping a nonempty menu M ′ to
a nonempty subset of M ′. Intuitively, CM,E(M ′) consists of the DM’s most preferred choices
from the menu M ′ when she considers the states in E possible and her decision are made
relative to menu M . (So, for example, if the DM is making her choices choices using regret
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minimization, the regret is taken with respect to M .) Note that there may be more than
one plan in CM,E(M
′); intuitively, this means that the DM does not view any of the plans in
CM,E(M
′) as strictly worse than some other plan.
What should M and E be when the DM makes a decision at a history h? We always take
E = E(h). Intuitively, this says that all that matters about a history as far as making a decision
is the set of states that the DM considers possible; the previous moves made to get to that
history are irrelevant. As we shall see, this seems reasonable in many examples. Moreover, it
is consistent with our choice of taking probability distributions only on the state space.
The choice of M is somewhat more subtle. The most obvious choice (and the one that has
typically been made in the literature, without comment) is that M consists of the plans that
are still feasible at h, where a plan f is feasible at a history h if, for all strict prefixes h′ of h,
f(h′) is also a prefix of h. So f is feasible at h if h is compatible with all of f ’s moves. Let Mh
be the set of plans feasible at h. While taking M = Mh is certainly a reasonable choice, as we
shall see, there are other reasonable alternatives.
Before addressing the choice of menu in more detail, we consider how to apply regret in
a dynamic setting. If we want to apply MER or MWER, we must update the probability
distributions. Epstein and Schneider [2003] and Hayashi [2009] consider prior-by-prior updating,
the most common way to update a set of probability measures, defined as follows:
P|pE = {Pr |E : Pr ∈ P,Pr(E) > 0}.
We can also apply prior-by-prior updating to a weighted set of probabilities:
P+|pE = {(Pr |E,α) : (Pr, α) ∈ P+,Pr(E) > 0}.
Prior-by-prior updating can produce some rather counter-intuitive outcomes. For example,
suppose we have a coin of unknown bias in [0.25, 0.75], and flip it 100 times. We can represent
our prior beliefs using a set of probability measures. However, if we use prior-by-prior updating,
then after each flip of the coin the set P+ representing the DM’s beliefs does not change, because
the beliefs are independent. Thus, in this example, prior-by-prior updating is not capturing the
information provided by the flips.
We consider another way of updating weighted sets of probabilities, called likelihood updating
[Halpern and Leung 2012]. The intuition is that the weights are updated as if they were a second-
order probability distribution over the probability measures. Given an event E ⊆ S, define
P+(E) = sup{αPr(E) : (Pr, α) ∈ P+}; if P+(E) > 0, let αlE = sup{(Pr′,α′)∈P+:Pr′ |E=Pr |E} α
′ Pr′(E)
P+(E) .
Given a measure Pr ∈ P, there may be several distinct measures Pr′ in P such that Pr′ |E =
Pr |E. Thus, we take the weight of Pr |E to be the sup of the possible candidate values of αlE .
By dividing by P+(E), we guarantee that αlE ∈ [0, 1], and that there is some weighted measure
(Pr, α) such that αlE = 1, as long as there is some pair (Pr, α) ∈ P+ such that αPr(E) = P
+
(E).
If P+(E) > 0, we take P+|lE, the result of applying likelihood updating by E to P+, to be
{(Pr |E,αlE) : (Pr, α) ∈ P+,Pr(E) > 0}.
In computing P+|lE, we update not just the probability measures in Pr ∈ P, but also
their weights, which are updated to αlE . Although prior-by-prior updating does not change the
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weights, for purposes of exposition, given a weighted probability measure (Pr, α), we use αpE to
denote the “updated weight” of Pr |E ∈ P+|pE; of course, αpE = α.
Intuitively, probability measures that are supported by the new information will get larger
weights using likelihood updating than those not supported by the new information. Clearly, if
all measures in P start off with the same weight and assign the same probability to the event
E, then likelihood updating will give the same weight to each probability measure, resulting
in measure-by-measure updating. This is not surprising, since such an observation E does not
give us information about the relative likelihood of measures.
Let reg
P+|lE
M (f) denote the regret of act f computed with respect to menu M and beliefs
P+|lE. If P+|lE is empty (which will be the case if P+(E) = 0) then regP+|lEM (f) = 0 for all
acts f . We can similarly define reg
P+|pE
M (f) for beliefs updated using prior-by-prior updating.
Also, let C
reg,P+|lE
M (M
′) be the set of acts in M ′ that minimize the weighted expected regret
reg
P+|lE
M . If P+|lE is empty, then Creg,P
+|lE
M (M
′) = M ′. We can similarly define Creg,P
+|pE
M ,
C
reg,P|E
M and C
reg,Pr |E
M .
3 Forgone opportunities
As we have seen, when making a decision at a history h in a dynamic decision problem, the
DM must decide what menu to use. In this section we focus on one choice. Take a forgone
opportunity to be a plan that was initially available to the DM, but is no longer available due
to earlier actions. As we observed in the introduction, while it may seem irrational to consider
forgone opportunities, people often do. Moreover, when combined with regret, behavior that
results by considering forgone opportunities may be arguably more rational than if forgone
opportunities are not considered. Consider the following example.
Example 3.1. Suppose that a student has an exam in two days. She can either start studying
today, play today and then study tomorrow, or just play on both days and never study. There
are two states of nature: one where the exam is difficult, and one where the exam is easy. The
utilities reflect a combination of the amount of pleasure that the student derives in the next
two days, and her score on the exam relative to her classmates. Suppose that the first day of
play gives the student p1 > 0 utils, and the second day of play gives her p2 > 0 utils. Her
exam score affects her utility only in the case where the exam is hard and she studies both
days, in which case she gets an additional g1 utils for doing much better than everyone else,
and in the case where the exam is hard and she never studies, in which case she loses g2 > 0
utils for doing much worse than everyone else. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of
the decision problem. Since, in this example, the available actions for the DM are independent
of nature’s move, for compactness, we omit nature’s initial move (whether the exam is easy or
hard). Instead, we describe the payoffs of the DM as a pair [a1, a2], where a1 is the payoff if
the exam is hard, and a2 is the payoff if the exam is easy.
Assume that 2p1 + p2 > g1 > p1 + p2 and 2p2 > g2 > p2. That is, if the test were hard, the
student would be happier studying and doing well on the test than she would be if she played
for two days, but not too much happier; similarly, the penalty for doing badly in the exam if the
exam is hard and she does not study is greater than the utility of playing the second day, but
7
play study
play study both days
[p1, p1]
[g1, 0]
[p1 + p2 − g2,
p1 + p2]
Figure 1: An explanation for procrastination.
not too much greater. Suppose that the student uses minimax regret to make her decision. On
the first day, she observes that playing one day and then studying the next day has a worst-case
regret of g1− p1, while studying on both days has a worst-case regret of p1 + p2. Therefore, she
plays on the first day. On the next day, suppose that she does not consider forgone opportunities
and just compares her two available options, studying and playing. Studying has a worst-case
regret of p2, while playing has a worst-case regret of g2− p2, so, since g2 < 2p2, she plays again
on the second day. On the other hand, if the student had included the forgone opportunity in
the menu on the second day, then studying would have regret g1−p1, while playing would have
regret g1 + g2 − p1 − p2. Since g2 > p2, studying minimizes regret. uunionsq
Example 3.1 emphasizes the roles of the menus M and M ′ in CM,E(M ′). Here we took
M , the menu relative to which choices were evaluated, to consist of all plans, even the ones
that were no longer feasible, while M ′ consisted of only feasible plans. In general, to determine
the menu component M of the choice function CM,E(h) used at a history h, we use a menu-
selection function µ. The menu µ(h) is the menu relative to which choice are computed at h.
We sometimes write Cµ,h rather than Cµ(h),E(h).
We can now formalize the notion of no preference reversal. Roughly speaking, this says
that if a plan f is considered one of the best at history h and is still feasible at an extension h′
of h, then f will still be considered one of the best plans at h′.
Definition 3.2 (No preference reversal). A family of choice functions Cµ,h has no preference
reversals if, for all histories h and all histories h′ extending h, if f ∈ Cµ,h(Mh) and f ∈ Mh′,
then f ∈ Cµ,h′(Mh′).
The fact that we do not get a preference reversal in Example 3.1 if we take forgone op-
portunities into account here is not just an artifact of this example. As we now show, as long
as we do not get new information and also use a constant menu (i.e., by keeping all forgone
opportunities in the menu), then there will be no preference reversals if we minimize (weighted)
expected regret in a dynamic setting.
Proposition 3.3. If, for all histories h, h′, we have E(h) = S and µ(h) = µ(h′), and decisions
are made according to MWER (i.e., the agent has a set P+ of weighted probability distributions
and a utility function u, and f ∈ Cµ,h(Mh) if f minimizes weighted expected regret with respect
to P+|lE(h) or P+|pE(h)), then no preference reversals occur.
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Hard Easy
Short Long Short Long
Pr1 1 0 0 0
Pr2 0 0.2 0.2 0.2
play-study 1 0 5 0
play-play 0 3 0 3
Table 1: αPr1 = 1, αPr2 = 0.6.
Proof. Suppose that f ∈ Cµ,〈s〉, h is a history extending 〈s〉, and f ∈ Mh. Since E(h) = S
and µ(h) = µ(〈s〉) by assumption, we have Cµ(h),E(h) = Cµ(〈s〉),E(〈s〉). By assumption, f ∈
Cµ(〈s〉,M〈s〉(M〈s〉) = Cµ(h),E(h)(M〈s〉). It is easy to check that MWER satisfies what is known
in decision theory as Sen’s α axiom [1988]: if f ∈ M ′ ⊆ M ′′ and f ∈ CM,E(M ′′), then
f ∈ CM,E(M ′). That is, if f is among the most preferred acts in menu M ′′, if f is in the
smaller menu M ′, then it must also be among the most preferred acts in menu M ′. Because
f ∈Mh ⊆M〈s〉 and f ∈ Cµ,〈s〉(M〈s〉), we have f ∈ Cµ(h),E(h)(Mh), as required.
Proposition 3.3 shows that we cannot have preference reversals if the DM does not learn
about the world. However, if the DM learns about the world, then we can have preference
reversals. Suppose, as is depicted in Table 1, that in addition to being hard and easy, the exam
can also be short or long. The student’s beliefs are described by the set of weighted probabilities
Pr1 and Pr2, with weights 1 and 0.6, respectively.
We take the option of studying on both days out of the picture by assuming that its utility
is low enough for it to never be preferred, and for it to never affect the regret computations.
After the first day, the student learns whether the exam will be hard or easy. One can verify
that the ex ante regret of playing then studying is lower than that of playing on both days,
while after the first day, the student prefers to play on the second day, regardless of whether
she learns that the exam is hard or easy.
4 Characterizing no preference reversal
We now consider conditions under which there is no preference reversal in a more general
setting, where the DM can acquire new information. While including all forgone opportunities
is no longer a sufficient condition to prevent preference reversals, it is necessary, as the following
example shows: Consider the two similar decision problems depicted in Figure 2. Note that
at the node after first playing L, the utilities and available choices are identical in the two
problems. If we ignore forgone opportunities, the DM necessarily makes the same decision in
both cases if his beliefs are the same. However, in the tree to the left, the ex ante optimal plan
is LR, while in the tree to the right, the ex ante optimal plan is LL. If the DM ignores forgone
opportunities, then after the first step, she cannot tell whether she is in the decision tree on
the left side, or the one on the right side. Therefore, if she follows the ex ante optimal plan in
one of the trees, she necessarily is not following the ex ante optimal plan in the other tree.
In light of this example, we now consider what happens if the DM learns information over
time. Our no preference reversal condition is implied by a well-studied notion called dynamic
9
[1, 2]
L R
L R
[2.1, 1]
[3, 0]
[1, 2]
L R
L R
[2.1, 1]
[0, 3]
Figure 2: Two decision trees.
consistency. One way of describing dynamic consistency is that a plan considered optimal at
a given point in the decision process is also optimal at any preceding point in the process, as
well as any future point that is reached with positive probability [Siniscalchi 2011]. For menu-
independent preferences, dynamic consistency is usually captured axiomatically by variations
of an axiom called Dynamic Consistency (DC) or the Sure Thing Principle [Savage 1954]. We
define a menu-dependent version of DC relative to events E and F using the following axiom.
The second part of the axiom implies that if f is strictly preferred conditional on E ∩F and at
least weakly preferred on Ec ∩F , then f is also strictly preferred on F . An event E is relevant
to a dynamic decision problem D if it is one of the events that the DM can potentially learn
in D, that is, if there exists a history h such that E(h) = E. A dynamic decision problem
D = (S,Σ, X, u,P) is “proper” if Σ is generated by the subsets of S relevant to D. Given a
decision problem D, we take the measurable sets to be the σ-algebra generated by the events
relevant to D. The following axioms hold for all measurable sets E and F , menus M and M ′,
and acts f and g.
Axiom 1 (DC-M). If f ∈ CM,E∩F (M ′) ∩ CM,Ec∩F (M ′), then f ∈ CM,F (M ′). If, furthermore,
g /∈ CM,E∩F (M ′), then g /∈ CM,F (M ′).
Axiom 2 (Conditional Preference). If f and g, when viewed as acts, give the same outcome
on all states in E, then f ∈ CM,E(M ′) iff g ∈ CM,E(M ′).
The next two axioms put some weak restrictions on choice functions.
Axiom 3. CM,E(M
′) ⊆M ′ and CM,E(M ′) 6= ∅ if M ′ 6= ∅.
Axiom 4 (Sen’s α). If f ∈ CM,E(M ′) and M ′′ ⊆M ′, then f ∈ CM,E(M ′′).
Theorem 4.1. For a dynamic decision problem D, if Axiom 1–4 hold and µ(h) = M for some
fixed menu M , then there will be no preference reversals in D.
We next provide a representation theorem that characterizes when Axioms 1–4 hold for
a MWER decision maker. The following condition says that the unconditional regret can be
computed by separately computing the regrets conditional on measurable events E ∩F and on
Ec ∩ F .
Definition 4.2 (SEP). The weighted regret of f with respect to M and P+ is separable with
respect to |χ (χ ∈ {p, l}) if for all measurable sets E and F such that P+(E ∩ F ) > 0 and
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P+(Ec ∩ F ) > 0,
reg
P+|χF
M (f) = sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|χ(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
,
and if reg
P+|χ(E∩F )
M (f) 6= 0, then
reg
P+|χF
M (f) > sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
αPr(Ec ∩ F )regP+|χ(Ec∩F )M (f).
We now show that Axioms 1–4 characterize SEP. Say that a decision problem D is based on
(S,Σ) if D = (S,Σ, X, u,P) for some X,u, and P. In the following results, we will also make
use of an alternative interpretation of weighted probability measures. Define a subprobability
measure p on (S,Σ) to be like a probability measure, in that it is a function mapping measurable
subsets of S to [0, 1] such that p(T ∪ T ′) = p(T ) + p(T ′) for disjoint sets T and T ′, except that
it may not satisfy the requirement that p(S) = 1. We can identify a weighted probability
distribution (Pr, α) with the subprobability measure αPr. (Note that given a subprobability
measure p, there is a unique pair (α,Pr) such that p = αPr: we simply take α = p(S) and
Pr = p/α.) Given a set P+ of weighted probability measures, we let C(P+) = {p ≥ ~0 :
∃c,∃Pr, (c,Pr) ∈ P+ and p ≤ cPr}.
Theorem 4.3. If P+ is a set of weighted distributions on (S,Σ) such that C(P+) is closed,
then the following are equivalent for χ ∈ {p, l}:
(a) For all decision problems D based on (S,Σ) and all menus M in D, Axioms 1–4 hold for
the family C
reg,P+|χE
M of choice functions.
(b) For all decision problems D based on (S,Σ), states s ∈ S, and acts f ∈M〈s〉, the weighted
regret of f with respect to M〈s〉 and P+ is separable with respect to |χ.
Note that Theorem 4.3 says that to check that Axioms 1–4 hold, we need to check only that
separability holds for initial menus M〈s〉.
It is not hard to show that SEP holds if the set P is a singleton. But, in general, it is not
obvious when a set of probability measures is separable. We thus provide a characterization
of separability, in the spirit of Epstein and LeBreton’s [1993] rectangularity condition. We
actually provide two conditions, one for the case of prior-by-prior updating, and another for
the case of likelihood updating. These definitions use the notion of maximum weighted expected
value of θ, defined as EP+(θ) = sup(Pr,α)∈P+
∑
s∈S αPr(s)θ(s). We use X to denote the closure
of a set X.
Definition 4.4 (χ-Rectangularity). A set P+ of weighted probability measures is χ-rectangular
(χ ∈ {p, l}) if for all measurable sets E and F ,
(a) if (Pr1, α1), (Pr2, α2), (Pr3, α3) ∈ P+, Pr1(E ∩ F ) > 0, and Pr2(Ec ∩ F ) > 0, then
α3Pr3(E ∩ F )αχ1,E∩FPr1|(E ∩ F ) + α3Pr3(Ec ∩ F )αχ2,Ec∩FPr2|(Ec ∩ F ) ∈ C(P+ |χ F ),
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(b) for all δ > 0, if P+(F ) > 0, then there exists (Pr, α) ∈ P+|χF such that α(δ Pr(E ∩F ) +
Pr(Ec ∩ F )) > sup(Pr′,α′)∈P+ α′ Pr′(Ec ∩ F ), and
(c) for all nonnegative real vectors θ ∈ R|S|,
sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )EP+|χ(E∩F )(θ) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )EP+|χ(Ec∩F )(θ)
) ≥ EP+|χF (θ).
Recall that Epstein and Schneider proved that rectangularity is a condition that guaran-
tees no preference reversal in the case of MMEU [Epstein and Schneider 2003], and Hayashi
proved a similar result for MER [Hayashi 2009]. With MMEU and MER, only unweighted
probabilities are considered. Definition 4.4 essentially gives the generalization of Epstein and
Schneider’s condition to weighted probabilities. Part (a) of χ-rectangularity is analogous to the
rectangularity condition of Epstein and Schneider. Part (b) of χ-rectangularity corresponds to
the assumption that (E ∩F ) is non-null, which is analogous to Axiom 5 in Epstein and Schnei-
der’s axiomatization. Finally, part (c) of χ-rectangularity holds for MMEU when weights are
in {0, 1}, and thus is not necessary for Epstein and Schneider. It is not hard to show that
we can replace condition (a) above by the requirement that P+ is closed under conditioning,
in the sense that if (Pr, α) ∈ P+, then so are (Pr |(E ∩ F ), α) and (Pr |(Ec ∩ F ), α).
As the following result shows, χ-rectangularity is indeed sufficient to give us Axioms 1–4
under prior-by-prior updating and likelihood updating.
Theorem 4.5. If C(P+) is closed and convex, then Axiom 1 holds for the family of choices
C
reg,P+|χE
M if and only if P+ is χ-rectangular.
The proof that χ-rectangularity implies Axiom 1 requires only that C(P+) be closed (i.e.,
convexity is not required). Hayashi [2011] proves an analogue of Theorem 4.5 for MER using
prior-by-prior updating. He also essentially assumes that the menu includes forgone opportuni-
ties, but his interpretation of forgone opportunities is quite different from ours. He also shows
that if forgone opportunities are not included in the menu, then the set of probabilities repre-
senting the DM’s uncertainty at all but the initial time must be a singleton. This implies that
the DM must behave like a Bayesian at all but the initial time, since MER acts like expected
utility maximization if the DM’s uncertainty is described by a single probability measure.
Epstein and Le Breton [1993] took this direction even further and prove that, if a few axioms
hold, then only Bayesian beliefs can be dynamically consistent. While Epstein and Le Breton’s
result was stated in a menu-free setting, if we use a constant menu throughout the decision
problem, then our model fits into their framework. At first glance, their impossibility result
may seem to contradict our sufficient conditions for no preference reversal. However, Epstein
and Le Breton’s impossibility result does not apply because one of their axioms, P4c, does not
hold for MER (or MWER). For ease of exposition, we give P4c for static decision problems.
Given acts f and g and a set T of states, let fTg be the act that agrees with f on T and agrees
with g on T c. Given an outcome x, let x∗ be the constant act that gives outcome x at all states.
Axiom 5 (Conditional weak comparative probability). For all events T,A,B, with A ∪ B ⊆
T , outcomes w, x, y, and z, and acts g, if w∗Tg  x∗Tg, z∗Tg  y∗Tg, and (w∗Ax∗)Tg 
(w∗Bx∗)Tg, then (z∗Ay∗)Tg  (z∗By∗)Tg.
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P4c implies Savage’s P4, and does not hold for MER and MWER in general. For a simple
counterexample, let S = {s1, s2, s3}, X = {o1, o5, o7, o10, o20, o23}, A = {s1}, B = {s2}, T =
A ∪ B, u(ok) = k, g is the act such that g(s1) = o20, g(s2) = o23, and g(s3) = o5. Let
P = {p1, p2, p3}, where
• p1(s1) = 0.25 and p1(s2) = 0.75;
• p2(s3) = 1;
• p3(s1) = 0.25 and p3(s3) = 0.75.
Let the menu M = {o∗1, o∗7, o∗10, o∗20, g}. Let  be the preference relation determined by MER.
The regret of o∗10Tg is 15 (this is the regret with respect to p2), and the regret of o∗7Tg is 15.25
(the regret with respect to p1), therefore o
∗
10Tg  o∗7Tg. It is also easy to see that the regret of
o∗20Tg is 15 (the regret with respect to p2), and the regret of o∗1Tg is 21.25 (the regret with respect
to p1), so o
∗
20Tg  o∗1Tg. Moreover, the regret of (o∗10Ao∗7)Tg is 15 (the regret with respect to p2),
and the regret of (o∗10Bo∗1)Tg is 15 (the regret with respect to p2), so (o∗10Ao∗7)Tg  (o∗10Bo∗1)Tg.
However, the regret of (o∗20Ao∗1)Tg is 16.5 (the regret with respect to p1), and the regret of
(o∗20Bo∗1)Tg is 16 (the regret with with respect to p3), therefore (o∗20Ao∗1)Tg 6 (o∗20Bo∗1)Tg.
Thus, Axiom 5 does not hold (taking y = o1, x = o7, w = o10, z = o20).
Siniscalchi [2011, Proposition 1] proves that his notion of dynamically consistent conditional
preference systems must essentially have beliefs that are updated by Baysian updating. How-
ever, his result does not apply in our case either, because it assumes consequentialism: that
the conditional preference system treats identical subtrees equally, independent of the greater
decision tree within which the subtrees belong. This does not happen if, for example, we take
forgone opportunities into account.
There may be reasons to exclude forgone opportunities from the menu. Consequentialism,
according to Machina [1989], is ‘snipping’ the decision tree at the current choice node, throwing
the rest of the tree away, and calculating preferences at the current choice node by applying
the original preference ordering to alternative possible continuations of the tree. With this
interpretation, consequentialism implies that forgone opportunities should be removed from
the menu.
Similarly, there many be reasons to exclude unachievable plans from the menu. Preferences
computed with unachievable plans removed from the menu would be independent of these
unachievable plans. This quality might make the preferences suitable for iterated elimination
of suboptimal plans as a way of finding the optimal plan. In certain settings, it may be difficult
to rank plans or find the most preferred plan among a large menu. For instance, consider the
problem of deciding on a career path. In these settings, it may be relatively easy to identify bad
plans, the elimination of which simplifies the problem. Conversely, computational benefits may
motivate a decision maker to ignore unachievable plans. That is, a decision maker may choose
to ignore unachievable plans because doing so simplifies the search for the preferred solution.
5 Conclusion
In dynamic decision problems, it is not clear which menu should be used to compute regret.
However, if we use MWER with likelihood updating, then in order to avoid preference reversals,
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we need to include all initially feasible plans in the menu, as well as richness conditions on the
beliefs. Another, well-studied approach to circumvent preference reversals is sophistication. A
sophisticated agent is aware of the potential for preference reversals, and thus uses backward
induction to determine the achievable plans, which are the plans that can actually be carried
out. In the procrastination example, a sophisticated agent would know that she would not
study the second day. Therefore, she knows that playing on the first day and then studying on
the second day is an unachievable plan.
Siniscalchi [2011] considers a specific type of sophistication, called consistent planning, based
on earlier definitions of Strotz [1955] and Gul and Pesendorfer [2005]. Assuming a filtration
information structure, Siniscalchi axiomatizes behavior resulting from consistent planning using
any menu-independent decision rule.1 With a menu-dependent decision rule, we need to consider
the choice of menu when using consistent planning. Hayashi [2009] axiomatizes sophistication
using regret-based choices, including MER and the smooth model of anticipated regret, under
the fixed filtration information setting. However, in his models of regret, Hayashi assumes that
the menu that the DM uses to compute regret includes only the achievable plans. In other
words, forgone opportunities and those plans that are not achievable are excluded from the
menu. It would be interesting to investigate the effect of including such in the menus of a
sophisticated DM. A sophisticated decision maker who takes unachievable plans into account
when computing regret can be understood as being “sophisticated enough” to understand that
her preferences may change in the future, but not sophisticated enough to completely ignore
the plans that she cannot force herself to commit to when computing regret. On the other
hand, a sophisticated decision maker who ignores unachievable plans does not feel regret for
not being able to commit to certain plans.
Finally, we have only considered “binary” menus in the sense that an act is either in the
menu and affects regret computation, or it is not. A possible generalization is to give different
weights to the acts in the menu, and multiply the regrets computed with respect to each act by
the weight of the act. For example, with respect to forgone opportunities, “recently forgone”
opportunities may warrant a higher weight than opportunities that have been forgone many
timesteps ago. Such treatment of forgone opportunities will definitely affect the behavior of the
DM.
A Proof of Theorem 4.1
We restate the theorem (and elsewhere in the appendix) for the reader’s convenience.
Theorem 4.1. For a dynamic decision problem D, if and µ(h) = M for some fixed menu
M , then there will be no preference reversals in D.
Proof. Before proving the result, we need some definitions. Say that an information set I refines
an information set I ′ if, for all h ∈ I, some prefix h′ of h is in I ′. Suppose that there is a history
h such that f, g ∈Mh and I(h) = I. Let fIg denote the plan that agrees with f at all histories
h′ such that I(h′) refines I and agrees with g otherwise. As we now show, fIg gives the same
1Siniscalchi considers a more general information structure where the information that the DM receives can
depend on her actions in an unpublished version of his paper [Siniscalchi 2006].
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outcome as f on states in E = E(h) and the same outcome as g on states in Ec; moreover,
fIg ∈Mh.
Suppose that s(h) = s and that s ∈ E. Since E(h) = E, there exists a history h′ ∈ I(h)
such that s(h′) = s′ and R(h′) = R(h). Since f, g ∈ Mh, there must exist some k such that
fk(〈s〉) = gk(〈s〉) = h (where, as usual, f0(〈s〉) = 〈s〉 and for k′ ≥ 1, fk′(〈s〉) = f(fk′−1(〈s〉))).
We claim that for all k′ ≤ k, fk′(〈s′〉) = gk′(〈s′〉), and fk′(〈s′〉) is in the same information set
as fk
′
(〈s〉). The proof is by induction on k′. If k′ = 0, the result follows from the observation
that since 〈s〉 is a prefix of h, there must be some prefix of h′ in I(〈s〉). For the inductive step,
suppose that k′ ≥ 1. We must have fk′(〈s〉) = gk′(〈s〉) (otherwise g would not be in Mh). Since
gk
′−1(〈s〉) = fk′−1(〈s〉) and fk′−1(〈s′〉) = gk′−1(〈s′〉) are in the same information set, by the
inductive hypothesis, g must perform the same action at gk
′−1(〈s〉) and gk′−1(〈s′〉), and must
perform the same action at fk
′−1(〈s〉) and fk′−1(〈s′〉). Since gk′(〈s〉) and fk′(〈s〉) are both
prefixes of h, g and f perform the same action at fk
′−1(〈s〉) = gk′−1(〈s〉). It follows that f
and g perform the same action at fk
′−1(〈s′〉) = gk′−1(〈s′〉), and so fk′(〈s′〉) = gk′(〈s′〉). Thus,
gk
′
(〈s′〉) must be a prefix of h′, and so must be in the same information set as fk′(〈s〉). This
completes the inductive proof.
Since fk(〈s′〉) = gk(〈s′〉) = h′, it follows that fk(〈s′〉) = (fIg)k(〈s′〉). Below I, all the infor-
mation sets are refinements of I, so by definition, for k′ ≤ k, we must fk′(〈s′〉) = (fIg)k′(〈s′〉).
Thus, f and fIg give the same outcome for s′, and hence all states in E. Note it follows that
(fIg)k(〈s〉) = h, so fIg ∈Mh.
For s′ /∈ E and all k′, it cannot be the case that I((fIg)k′(〈s′〉)) is a refinement of I, since
the first state in (fIg)k
′
(〈s′〉)) is s′, and no history in a refinement of I has a first state of s′.
Thus, fIgk
′
(〈s′〉) = gk′(〈s′〉) for all k′, so f and fIg give the same outcome for s′, and hence
all states in Ec.
Returning to the proof of the proposition, suppose that f ∈ Cµ,h(Mh), h′ is a history
extending h, and f ∈ Mh′ . We want to show that f ∈ Cµ,h′(Mh′). By perfect recall, E(h′) ⊆
E(h). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that f /∈ Cµ,h′(Mh′). Since f ∈ Cµ,h′(Mh′), we cannot
have E(h′) = E(h), so E(h′) ⊂ E(h). Choose f ′ ∈ Cµ,E(h′)(Mh′) and g ∈ Cµ,E(h′)c∩E(h)(Mh′)
(note that Cµ,E(h′)(Mh′) 6= ∅ and Cµ,E(h′)c∩E(h)(Mh′) 6= ∅ by Axiom 3). Since f ′, g ∈ Mh′ (by
Axiom 3), f ′I(h′)g is in Mh′ . Since f ′I(h′)g and f ′, when viewed as acts, agree on states in
E(h′), we must have f ′I(h′)g ∈ Cµ,E(h′)(Mh′) by Axiom 2. Similarly, since f ′I(h′)g and g, when
viewed as acts, agree on states in E(h′)c ∩ E(h), we must have f ′I(h′)g ∈ Cµ,E(h′)c∩E(h)(Mh′).
Therefore, by Axiom 1, f ′I(h′)g ∈ Cµ,h(Mh′). Also by Axiom 1, since f /∈ Cµ,h′(Mh′), we must
have f /∈ Cµ,h(Mh′). By Axiom 4, this implies that f /∈ Cµ,h(Mh) (since Mh′ ⊆Mh), giving us
the desired contradiction.
B Proof of Theorem 4.3
Theorem 4.3. If P+ is a set of weighted distributions on (S,Σ) such that C(P+) is closed,
then the following are equivalent:
(a) For all decision problems D based on (S,Σ) and all menus M in D, Axioms 1–4 hold for
choice functions represented by P+|lE (resp., P+|pE).
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(b) For all decision problems D based on (S,Σ), states s ∈ S, and acts f ∈M〈s〉, the weighted
regret of f with respect to M〈s〉 and P+ is separable.
We actually prove the following stronger result.
Theorem B.1. If P+ is a set of weighted distributions on (S,Σ) such that C(P+) is closed,
then the following are equivalent:
(a) For all decision problems D based on (S,Σ), Axioms 1–4 hold for menus of the form M〈s〉
for choice functions represented by P+|lE (resp., P+|pE).
(b) For all decision problems D based on (S,Σ) and all menus M in D, Axioms 1–4 hold for
choice functions represented by P+|lE (resp., P+|pE).
(c) For all decision problems D based on (S,Σ), states s ∈ S, and acts f ∈M〈s〉, the weighted
regret of f with respect to M〈s〉 and P+ is separable.
(d) For all decision problems D based on (S,Σ), menus M in D, and acts f ∈M, the weighted
regret of f with respect to M and P+ is separable.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary state space S, measurable events E,F ⊆ S, and a set P+ of weighted
distributions on (S,Σ). The fact that (b) implies (a) and (d) implies (c) follows immediately.
Therefore, it remains to show that (a) implies (d) and that (c) implies (b).
Since the proof is identical for prior-by-prior updating (|p) and for likelihood updating (|l),
we use | to denote the updating operator. That is, the proof can be read with | denoting |p, or
with | denoting |l.
To show that (a) implies (d), we first show that Axiom 1 implies that for all decision
problems D based on (S,Σ), menu M in D, sets P+ of weighted probabilities, and acts f ∈M,
reg
P+|F
M (f) ≥ sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
. (1)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that (1) does not hold. Then for some decision problem D
based on (S,Σ), measurable events E,F ⊆ S, menu M in D, and act f ∈M , we have that
reg
P+|F
M (f) < sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M,F (f)
)
.
We define a new decision problem D′ based on (S,Σ). The idea is that in D′, we will have a
plan af ′ such that af ′ ∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,E∩F (M
′′) and af ′ ∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,Ec∩F (M
′′) and af ′ /∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,F (M
′′) for
some M ′′ ⊆M ′, where M ′ is the menu at the initial decision node for the DM.
We construct D′ as follows. D′ is a depth-two tree; that is, nature makes a single move,
and then the DM makes a single move. At the first step, nature choose a state s ∈ F . At the
second step, the DM chooses from the set {ag : g ∈M} ∪ {af ′} of actions. With a slight abuse
of notation, we let ag also denote the plan in T
′ that chooses the action ag at the initial history
〈s〉. Therefore, the initial menu in decision problem D′ is M ′ = {ag : g ∈M} ∪ {af ′}.
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The utilities for the actions/plans in D′ are defined as follows. For actions {ag : g ∈ M},
the utility of ag in state s is just the utility of the outcome resulting from applying plan g in
state s in decision problem D. The action af ′ has utilities
u(af ′(s)) =
{
supg∈M u(g(s))− regP
+|(E∩F )
M (f) if s ∈ E ∩ F
supg∈M u(g(s))− regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M (f) if s ∈ Ec ∩ F.
For all states s ∈ F , we have that u(af ′(s)) ≤ supg∈M u(g(s)). As a result, for all states
s ∈ F , we have that
sup
g∈M
u(g(s)) = sup
ag∈M ′
u(ag(s)).
Since the regret of a plan in state s depends only on its payoff in s and the best payoff in s, it
is not hard to see that the regrets of ag with respect to M
′ is the same as the regret of g with
respect to M . More precisely, for all g ∈M ,
reg
P+|(E∩F )
M ′ (ag) = reg
P+|(E∩F )
M (g),
reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M ′ (ag) = reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M (g), and
reg
P+|F
M ′ (ag) = reg
P+|F
M (g).
By definition of af ′ , for each state s ∈ E ∩ F , we have regM ′(af ′ , s) = regP
+|(E∩F )
M (f),
and for each state s ∈ Ec ∩ F , we have regM ′(af ′ , s) = regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M (f). Thus, for all
Pr ∈ P, if Pr(E ∩ F ) 6= 0, then regPr |(E∩F )M (f) = regP
+|(E∩F )
M (f), and if Pr(E
c ∩ F ) 6= 0,
then reg
Pr |(Ec∩F )
M (f) = reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M (f). If for all (Pr, α) ∈ P+|(E ∩ F ), αPr(E ∩ F ) = 0,
then reg
P+|(E∩F )
M ′ (af ′) = reg
P+|(E∩F )
M ′ (af ) = 0. Otherwise, since there is some measure in
P+|(E ∩ F ) that has weight 1, we must have regP+|(E∩F )M ′ (af ′) = regP
+|(E∩F )
M ′ (af ). Similarly,
reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M ′ (af ′) = reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M ′ (af ). Thus,
reg
P+|F
M ′ (af ′) = sup(Pr,α)∈P+ α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
> reg
P+|F
M (f) [by assumption]
= reg
P+|F
M ′ (af ) [by construction].
Therefore, we have af ′ ∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,E∩F ({af ′ , af}), af ′ ∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,Ec∩F ({af ′ , af}), and af ′ /∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,F ({af ′ , af}),
violating Axiom 1.
By an analogous argument, we show that the opposite weak inequality,
reg
P+|F
M (f) ≤ sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
, (2)
is also implied by Axiom 1. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that (2) does not hold. Then
for some decision problem D based on (S,Σ), measurable events E,F ⊆ S, menu M in D, and
act f ∈M , we have that
reg
P+|F
M (f) > sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M,F (f)
)
.
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We define a decision problem D′ based on (S,Σ) just as in the previous case. Specifically, we
have that reg
P+|(E∩F )
M ′ (af ′) = reg
P+|(E∩F )
M ′ (af ), and that reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M ′ (af ′) = reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M ′ (af ).
The one difference from the previous case is that we now have
reg
P+|F
M ′ (af ′) = sup(Pr,α)∈P+ α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
< reg
P+|F
M (f) [by assumption]
= reg
P+|F
M ′ (af ) [by construction].
Therefore, we have af ∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,E∩F ({af ′ , af}), af ∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,Ec∩F ({af ′ , af}), and af /∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,F ({af ′ , af}),
violating Axiom 1.
To complete the proof that (a) implies (d), we show that Axiom 1 also implies that for all
decision problems D based on (S,Σ), menus M in D, sets P+ of weighted probabilities, and
acts f ∈M , if regP+|(E∩F )M (f) > 0, then
reg
P+|F
M (f) > sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
αPr(Ec ∩ F )regP+|(Ec∩F )M (f). (3)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that (3) does not hold. Then for some decision problem D
based on (S,Σ), events E,F ⊆ S, menu M in D, and act f ∈M such that regP+|(E∩F )M (f) > 0
and
reg
P+|F
M (f) ≤ sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
αPr(Ec ∩ F )regP+|(Ec∩F )M (f).
We now define a new decision problem D′ based on (S,Σ). The idea is that in D′, we have a
plan af such that af /∈ Creg,P
+
M,E∩F (M
′) but af ∈ Creg,P
+
M,F (M
′) for some M ′ ⊆M .
Construct D′ exactly as before. That is, in the first step, nature chooses a state s ∈ S, and
in the second step, the DM chooses from the set of actions/plans M ′ = {ag : g ∈ M} ∪ {ag′}.
For each g ∈M , define the actions ag as before. We define a new action ag′ with utilities
u(ag′(s)) =
{
supg∈M u(g(s)), if s ∈ E ∩ F
supg∈M u(g(s))− regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M (f), if s ∈ Ec ∩ F.
It is almost immediate from the definition of ag′ that we have
reg
P+|F
M ′ (ag′) = sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
α
(
Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP+|(Ec∩F )M (f)
)
≥ regP+|FM ′ (af ).
However, we also have
reg
P+|(E∩F )
M ′ (ag) = 0 < reg
P+|(E∩F )
M ′ (af ).
Therefore, we have af /∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,E∩F ({ag′ , af}) but af ∈ Creg,P
+
M ′,F ({ag′ , af}), violating Axiom 1.
We next show that (c) implies (b). Specifically, we show that SEP for the initial menus of
all decision problems D is sufficient to guarantee that Axioms 1–4 hold for menu M and all
choice sets M ′ ⊆M . It is easy to check that Axioms 2–4 hold for MWER, so we need to check
only Axiom 1.
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Consider an arbitrary decision problem D, menu M in D, M ′ ⊆ M , and a plan f in M ′.
We construct a new decision problem D′ such that the initial menu of D′ is “equivalent” to M .
Just as before, let D′ be a two-stage decision problem where in the first stage, nature chooses
s ∈ S, and in the second stage, the DM chooses from the set M0 = {ag : g ∈ M}, where ag is
defined as before. Again, we associate each action ag with the plan that chooses ag in D
′. M0
is then “equivalent” to M in the sense that
reg
P+|(E∩F )
M0
(ag) = reg
P+|(E∩F )
M (g),
reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(ag) = reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M (g), and
reg
P+|F
M0
(ag) = reg
P+|F
M (g).
Suppose that f ∈ Creg,P+M,E∩F (M ′) and f ∈ Creg,P
+
M,Ec∩F (M
′). This means that for all g ∈ M ′, we
have reg
P+|(E∩F )
M0
(af ) ≤ regP
+|(E∩F )
M0
(ag) and reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(af ) ≤ regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(ag). Therefore,
we have
reg
P+|F
M (f) = reg
P+|F
M0
(af )
= sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M0 (af ) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(af )
)
≤ sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M0 (ag) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(ag)
)
= reg
P+|F
M (g),
which means that f ∈ Creg,P+M,F (M ′), as required.
Next, consider an act g ∈M ′ such that g /∈ Creg,P+M,E∩F (M ′). This means that regP
+|(E∩F )
M0
(af ) <
reg
P+|(E∩F )
M0
(ag) and reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(af ) ≤ regP
+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(ag). Let (αPr∗ ,Pr
∗) ∈ C(P+) be such
that
αPr∗(Pr
∗(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M0 (ag) + Pr∗(Ec ∩ F )reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(ag)
= sup(Pr,α)∈P+ α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M0 (ag) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(ag)
)
.
Such a pair (αPr∗ ,Pr
∗) exists, since we have assumed that C(P+) is closed. If αPr∗Pr∗(E∩F ) =
0, then reg
P+|F
M0
(ag) = sup(Pr,α)∈P+ α
(
Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP+|(Ec∩F )M0 (ag)
)
. By separability, it must
be the case that reg
P+|(E∩F )
M0
(ag) = 0, contradicting our assumption that 0 ≤ regP
+|(E∩F )
M0
(af ) <
reg
P+|(E∩F )
M0
(ag). Therefore, it must be that αPr∗ Pr
∗(E ∩ F ) > 0, and
reg
P+|F
M (f) = reg
P+|F
M0
(af )
= sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M0 (af ) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(af )
)
< sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|(E∩F )M0 (ag) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )reg
P+|(Ec∩F )
M0
(ag)
)
= reg
P+|F
M (g),
which means that g /∈ Creg,P+M,F (M ′).
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C Proof of Theorem 4.5
To prove Theorem 4.5, we need the following lemma.
Lemma C.1. For all utility functions u, sets P+ of weighted probabilities, acts f , and menus
M containing f , regP+M (f) = reg
C(P+)
M (f).
Proof. Simply observe that
regP
+
M (f) = sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
(
α
∑
s∈S
Pr(s)regM (f, s)
)
= sup
(Pr,α)∈P+
(∑
s∈S
αPr(s)regM (f, s)
)
= sup
{p: p≤αPr,(Pr,α)∈P+}
(∑
s∈S
p(s)regM (f, s)
)
= reg
C(P+)
M (f),
by definition.
The next lemma uses an argument almost identical to one used in Lemma 7 of [Halpern
and Leung 2012].
Lemma C.2. If C(P+|χF ) is convex and q is a subprobability on F not in C(P+|χF ), then
there exists a non-negative vector θ such that for all (Pr, α) ∈ P+|χF , we have∑
s∈F
αPr(s)θ(s) <
∑
s∈F
q(s)θ(s).
Proof. Given a set P+ of weighted probabilities, let C ′(P+) = {p : p ∈ R|S| and p ≤ αPr for some (Pr, α) ∈
P+}. Note that an element q ∈ C ′(P+) may not be a subprobability measure, since we do not
require that q(s) ≥ 0. Since C ′(P+|χF ) and {q} are closed, convex, and disjoint, and {q} is
compact, the separating hyperplane theorem [Rockafellar 1970] says that there exist θ ∈ R|S|
and c ∈ R such that
θ · p < c for all p ∈ C ′(P+|χF ), and θ · q > c. (4)
Since {αPr : (Pr, α) ∈ P+|χF} ⊆ C ′(P+|χF ), we have that for all (Pr, α) ∈ P+|χF ,∑
s∈F
αPr(s)θ(s) <
∑
s∈F
q(s)θ(s).
Now we argue that it must be the case that θ(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ F . Suppose that θ(s′) < 0 for
some s′ ∈ F . Define p∗ by setting
p∗(s) =
{
0, if s 6= s′
−|c|
|θ(s′)| , if s = s
′.
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Note that p∗ ≤ ~0, since for all s ∈ S, p∗(s) ≤ 0. Therefore, p∗ ∈ C ′(P+|χF ).
Our definition of p∗ also ensures that θ · p∗ = ∑s∈S p∗(s)θ(s) = p∗(s′)θ(s′) = |c| ≥ c. This
contradicts (4), which says that θ · p < c for all p ∈ C ′(P+|χF ). Thus it must be the case that
θ(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.5, which we restate here.
Theorem 4.5. If C(P+) is closed and convex, then Axiom 1 holds for the family of choices
C
reg,P+|χE
M if and only if P+ is χ-rectangular.
We prove the two directions of implication in the theorem separately. Note that the proof
that χ-rectangularity implies Axiom 1 does not require C(P+) to be convex.
Claim C.3. If P+ is χ-rectangular, then Axiom 1 holds for the family of choices Creg,P+|χEM .
Proof. By Theorem 4.3, it suffices to show that SEP holds. For the first part of SEP, we must
show that
reg
P+|χF
M (f) = sup
(Pr,α)∈P+|χF
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|χ(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
.
(5)
Unwinding the definitions, (5) is equivalent to
reg
P+|χF
M (f)
= sup(Pr3,α3)∈P+|χF αPr3
(
Pr3(E ∩ F ) sup(Pr1,α1)∈P+|χF αχ1,E∩F
∑
s∈E∩F Pr1(s|(E ∩ F ))regM (f, s))
+ Pr3(E
c ∩ F ) sup(Pr2,α2)∈P+|χF αχ2,Ec∩F
∑
s∈Ec∩F Pr2(s|(Ec ∩ F ))regM (f, s))
)
.
The sups in this expression are taken on by some (Pr∗1, α∗1), (Pr
∗
2, α
∗
2), (Pr
∗
3, α
∗
3) ∈ P+|χF . By
χ-rectangularity, we have that for all (Pr1, α1), (Pr2, α2), (Pr3, α3) ∈ P+|χF ,
αPr3Pr3(E ∩ F )αχ1,E∩FPr1|(E ∩ F ) + αPr3Pr3(Ec ∩ F )αχ2,Ec∩FPr2|(Ec ∩ F ) ∈ C(P+|χF ). (6)
Thus, for all  > 0,
reg
P+|χF
M (f)
= reg
C(P+|χF )
M (f) [by Lemma C.1]
≥ α∗3
(
Pr∗3(E ∩ F )(α∗1,E∩F )χ
∑
s∈E∩F Pr
∗
1(s|(E ∩ F ))regM (f, s))
+ Pr∗3(Ec ∩ F )(α∗2,Ec∩F )χ
∑
s∈Ec∩F Pr
∗
2(s|(Ec ∩ F ))regM (f, s))
)
−  [by (6)].
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Therefore,
reg
P+|χF
M (f)
≥ α∗3
(
Pr∗3(E ∩ F )(α∗1,E∩F )χ
∑
s∈E∩F Pr
∗
1(s|(E ∩ F ))regM (f, s))
+ Pr∗3(Ec ∩ F )(α∗2,Ec∩F )χ
∑
s∈Ec∩F Pr
∗
2(s|(Ec ∩ F ))regM (f, s))
)
= sup(Pr3,α3)∈P+|χF α3
(
Pr3(E ∩ F ) sup(Pr1,α1)∈P+|χF αχ1,E∩F
∑
s∈E∩F Pr1(s|(E ∩ F ))regM (f, s))
+ Pr3(E
c ∩ F ) sup(Pr2,α2)∈P+|χF αχ2,Ec∩F
∑
s∈Ec∩F Pr2(s|(Ec ∩ F ))regM (f, s))
)
[by the choice of (Pr∗i , α∗i ), i = 1, 2, 3]
= sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|χ(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
,
as required.
It remains to show the opposite inequality in (5), namely, that
reg
P+|χF
M (f) ≤ sup
(Pr,α)∈P+|χF
α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|χ(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
.
It suffices to note that the right-hand side is equal to
sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF
(
αPr(E ∩ F ) sup(Pr1,α1)∈P+|χF αχ1,E∩F
∑
s∈E∩F Pr1(s|E ∩ F )regM (f, s))
+αPr(Ec ∩ F ) sup(Pr2,α2)∈P+|χF αχ2,Ec∩F
∑
s∈Ec∩F Pr2(s|Ec ∩ F )regM (f, s))
)
≥ EP+|χF (regM (f)) [by rectangularity]
= reg
P+|χF
M (f).
This completes the proof that (5) holds.
For the second part of SEP, suppose that P+(E ∩ F ) > 0 and regP+|χ(E∩F )M (f) 6= 0.
If reg
P+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f) = 0 then, since P
+
(E ∩ F ) > 0, we have that regP+|χFM (f) > 0 =
sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF αPr(Ec∩F )regP
+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f), as desired. Otherwise, by part (b) of χ-rectangularity,
for all δ > 0, there exists (Pr, α) ∈ P+|χF such that α(δ Pr(E∩F )+Pr(Ec∩F )) > sup(Pr′,α′)∈P+ α′ Pr′(Ec∩
F ). Therefore, using the first part of SEP, we have
reg
P+|χ(E∩F )
M (f)
= sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|χ(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
= reg
P+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f) sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF α
(
Pr(E ∩ F ) reg
P+|χ(E∩F )
M (f)
reg
P+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f)
+ Pr(Ec ∩ F )
)
> reg
P+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f) sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF αPr(E
c ∩ F ) [by part (b) of χ-rectangularity]
= sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF αPr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f),
as required.
Claim C.4. If C(P+) is convex and Axiom 1 holds for the family of choices Creg,P+|χEM , then
P+ is χ-rectangular.
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Proof. Suppose that χ-rectangularity does not hold. Then one of the three conditions of rect-
angularity must fail.
First suppose that it is (a); that is, for some (Pr1, α1), (Pr2, α2), (Pr3, α3) ∈ P+, we have
Pr1(E ∩ F ) > 0 and Pr2(Ec ∩ F ) > 0 and
α3Pr3(E ∩ F )αχ1,E∩FPr1|(E ∩ F ) + α3Pr3(Ec ∩ F )αχ2,Ec∩FPr2|(Ec ∩ F ) /∈ C(P+)|χF .
Let p∗ = α3Pr3(E ∩F )αχ1,E∩FPr1|(E ∩F ) +α3Pr3(Ec ∩F )αχ2,Ec∩FPr2|(Ec ∩F ). Since we have
assumed that C(P+) is convex, we have that C(P+|χF ) is also convex. By Lemma C.2, there
exists a non-negative vector θ such that for all αPr ∈ C(P+|χF ), we have∑
s∈F
αPr(s)θ(s) <
∑
s∈F
p∗(s)θ(s).
We construct a decision problem D based on (S,Σ). D has two stages: in the first stage,
nature chooses a state s ∈ S, but only states in F ⊆ S are chosen with positive probability,
so when the DM plays, his beliefs are characterized by P+|χF . In the second stage, the DM
chooses an action from the set M = {f, g}, with utilities defined as follows:
u(f, s) = −θ(s), and
u(g, s) = 0 for all s.
The act f will have regret precisely θ(s) in state s ∈ S. By Lemma C.2,
sup(Pr,α)∈P+ α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|χ(E∩F )M (f) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
≥ αPr3
(
Pr3(E ∩ F )regα
χ
1,E∩F Pr1 |(E∩F )
M (f) + Pr(E
c ∩ F )regα
χ
2,Ec∩F Pr2 |(Ec∩F )
M (f)
)
=
∑
s∈F p
∗(s)θ(s)
> sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF reg
P+|χF
M (f),
violating SEP. By Theorem 4.3, Axiom 1 cannot hold.
Now suppose that condition (b) in rectangularity does not hold. That is, for some δ > 0,
for all (α,Pr) ∈ P+, α(δ Pr(E ∩F ) + Pr(Ec∩F )) ≤ sup(Pr′,α′)∈P+ α′ Pr′(Ec∩F ). We construct
a decision problem D based on (S,Σ). D has two stages: in the first stage, nature chooses a
state s ∈ S. In the second stage, the DM chooses an action from the set M = {f, g}, with
utilities defined as follows:
u(f, s) = 0 for all s ∈ S,
u(g, s) = −δ if s ∈ E ∩ F
u(g, s) = −1 if s /∈ E ∩ F .
Then we have that reg
P+|χ(E∩F )
M (g) = δ and reg
P+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (g) = 1. Using SEP and the choice
of δ, we must have
reg
P+|χF
M (g) = sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF α(Pr(E ∩ F )δ + Pr(Ec ∩ F ))
≤ supPr∈P+|χF αPr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|χ(Ec∩F )
M (g).
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Clearly,
reg
P+|χF
M (g) ≥ sup
(Pr,α)∈P+|χF
αPr(Ec ∩ F )regP+|χ(Ec∩F )M (g).
Thus,
reg
P+|χF
M (g) = sup
(Pr,α)∈P+|χF
αPr(Ec ∩ F )regP+|χ(Ec∩F )M (g),
violating the second condition of SEP. Therefore, by Theorem 4.3, Axiom 1 does not hold.
Finally, suppose that condition (c) in rectangularity does not hold. Then for some nonneg-
ative real vector θ ∈ R|S|,
sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF
(
αPr(E) sup(Pr1,α1)∈P+|χ(E∩F )
∑
s∈E∩F α1 Pr1(s|E)θ(s))
+αPr(Ec) sup(Pr2,α2)∈P+|χ(Ec∩F )
∑
s∈Ec∩F α2 Pr2(s|Ec)θ(s))
)
< sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF α
∑
s∈F Pr(s)θ(s).
(7)
We construct a decision problem D based on (S,Σ). D has two stages: in the first stage, nature
chooses a state s ∈ S. In the second stage, the DM chooses an action from the set M = {f, g},
with utilities defined as follows:
u(g, s) = −θ(s) for all s ∈ S.
u(f, s) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
So we have
sup(Pr,α)∈P+|pF α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )regP+|p(E∩F )M (g) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )regP
+|p(Ec∩F )
M (g)
)
= sup(Pr,α)∈P+|χF α
(
Pr(E ∩ F )EP+|χ(E∩F )(θ) + Pr(Ec ∩ F )EP+|χ(Ec∩F )(θ)
)
< EP+|χF (θ) [by (7)]
= reg
P+|pF
M (g).
This means that SEP, and hence Axiom 1, is violated, a contradiction.
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